3. If the egregious harm standard does apply on direct review in this case, did the appellate court correctly apply the egregious harm standard when it only considered the testimony that supported the state's case and not "the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole" as required by Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

3. Did the court of appeals err by finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on an unexplained finding in the judgment without addressing the State's threshold arguments about the validity of the judgment entry, preservation, and estoppel?

2. Whether the court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.

(4) The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Ms. Cary's Conviction For Engaging In Organized Criminal Activity And Money Laundering.

4. If a warrantless blood draw conducted pursuant to TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 724.012(b) violates the Fourth Amendment, must that evidence be suppressed when, at the time of the search, the statute was presumptively valid and that it dispensed with the warrant requirement?

(3) what harm or materiality standard applies

4. Does the Texas Supreme Court's having mandated that intermediate appellate courts construe liberally the rules of appellate procedure regarding the correction of appellate record inaccuracies also mandate the application of such liberal rule constructions for the purposes of determining whether the intermediate appellate court's jurisdiction has been invoked when the appellate record on its face reflects potential clerical error that not only pertains directly to the jurisdictional issue, but also conflicts with the application of the presumption of regularity?

2. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously affirm the trial court's order revoking Petitioner's probation when the probation was revoked because Petitioner failed to attend and meet the requisite number of goals of a sex offender treatment program for an offense that had been expunged and for which he had been found "not guilty?"

4. Does application of implied consent negate the necessity of a warrant or exigent circumstances in order to obtain a blood sample under Section 724.012(b) of the Transportation Code?

3. The court of appeals affirmed on a jury charge that was grossly incorrect by ignoring and then misapplying this Court's precedent.

4. Did the Second Court of Appeals err in concluding that the skirmish line set up by the police department during the Fort Worth Gay Pride Parade was not a reasonable action as to "time, place or manner" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?

See also Ramon Marroquin (No. PD-0894-14)

2. The Court of Appeal[s’] holding, that cell tower data information conveyed from a phone involuntarily, is public information under the third party record doctrine; is contrary to Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

ON COURT'S OWN MOTION: The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not deny Appellant due process of law and the right to confrontation when, after signing the original judgment, the trial court almost three months later entered an erroneous judgment nunc pro tunc adding a deadly weapon finding without notice to Appellant.

2. Must the State comply with federal requirements under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to obtain a citizen's medical records, and if it fails to do so, is there any remedy?

2. The justices of the Second Court of Appeals disagree as to the application of Confrontation and cross examination of a complaining witness who had molested his younger sister for a number of years before and after the outcry against Appellant.

3. The court of appeals erred in finding that the appellant was harmed by any unanimity error in the jury charge because his defense was not predicated on isolating one transaction from another.

3. Did the court of appeals err by reversing the trial judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress that Appellant committed a traffic violation when the same facts objectively demonstrated reasonable suspicion?

2. Does a clerk's actions of filing and recording a lien equate to "signing or executing" under Texas Penal Code Section 32.46(a)(1)?

3. Whether convictions for multiple charges of failure to appear arising from a single failure to appear constitute double jeopardy.

4. Did the Second Court of Appeals err in concluding that the skirmish line set up by the police department during the Fort Worth Gay Pride Parade was not a reasonable action as to "time, place or manner" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?

See also Joey Faust (No. PD-0893-14)

The Court of Appeals erred in finding the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for Assault by Strangulation - Family Violence. The evidence failed to show that Petitioner impeded the complainant's normal breathing, or that he caused her bodily injury by doing so.

2. Was the evidence sufficient when the only evidence was a entry in 1000 page CPS report that the minor child was "always" "up her butt" when referring to where the minor child stayed when around her mother with no evidence that the same was true for other adults.

3. What isthe remedy for insufficient evidence of the charged offense when the evidence was sufficient to prove a lesser included offense but the record does not indicate that the fact-finder affirmatively found the lesser-included offense?

3. By giving binding effect to the trial court's failure to supplement its non-Padilla findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court of appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

6. whether Applicant is entitled to relief under Article 11.073(b).

4. Is conducting a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, can an intermediate appellate court disregard a trial court's specific findings of fact?

Vol. 29, No. 6
02/10/2014

4. Was the court of appeals correct to reverse the trial court's judgment as to conviction and sentence? Or should the court of appeals have only reversed the trial court's judgment as to sentence?

ON COURT'S OWN MOTION: Whether the Fourteenth Court of Appeals decision that the "appellant failed to satisfy his burden to show that the statute is invalid in all possible applications because he has not established what the funds designated in [Texas Local Government Code] section 133.102(e) actually do" is erroneous in light of clear precedent from this court in reviewing facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute.

2.Did the Twelfth Court of Appeals err by holding that Section 38.111, Penal Code, as applied to Schlittler, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

2. Is TDCJ's policy of not "releasing" a prisoner to mandatory supervision on one concurrent sentence until the prisoner is "eligible for release" on all concurrent sentences legal?

Mr. Smith's conviction under Texas Penal Code Section 33.031(b) is void because the Court of Criminal Appeals held this statutory subsection facially unconstitutional.

3. Whether Applicant may raise his claim for the first time in an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

2. Whether the defendant preserves his Fourth Amendment objection to blood evidence when he fails to object to testimony concerning the results of testing done on that blood and only later objects to admission of the blood sample itself.

2. If Patterson is still valid, is indecency by exposure incident to and subsumed by indecency by contact when the defendant masturbates in front of the victim and causes the victim to touch the defendant's penis?

5. The trial court erred by sustaining the State's relevance objection to Appellant's proffered evidence that the commitment order was on appeal.

2. If the State is required to allege all known violations or risk forfeiting them, is that requirement subject to waiver or estoppel?

3. Where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that counsel sufficiency advised Torres that deportation was an inevitable consequence after his guilty plea, the Eighth Court erroneously held that counsel rendered deficient performance simply because he did not specifically stated that Torres's plea "will" result in his removal.

4. The lower court's majority opinion erred in holding that the appellant was harmed by the admission of his statement when there was overwhelming evidence of the appellant's guilt independent of his statement to the police.

4. Did the court of appeals err in its conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances?

2. Whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the sentencing jury would have reached a more favorable penalty-phase verdict.

3. The evidence supported the court’s finding of true, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ holding.