3. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the evidence was insufficient to support Balentines conviction for robbery.

2. The Court of Appeals erred by placing the burden of proof on the Petitioner to show that the leg irons by which he was shackled were visible to the jury, or otherwise infringed upon his constitutional right to be tried without restraints.

4. Should a court of appeals conduct a harm analysis after an allegedly erroneous denial of a motion for continuance to obtain a transcript of the guilt-innocence proceedings when the only issue on retrial is proper punishment?

2. Can the subsequent discovery of a warrant's ambiguity, as a result of the use of a possibly incorrect numerical address to describe the place to be searched, provide a reason for invalidating the warrant when the officer reasonably relied upon Appellant's use of that address to identify his home?

2.Is a trial court's direct response to counsel's evidentiary argument during the State's case-in-chief "naturally and necessarily" a comment on the defendant's failure to testify?

2. Did the trial court fail to "consider" factors concerning Appellant's ability to pay restitution as required under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art 42.037(h)?

4. The Restitution Order Is An Illegal Sentence Because It Orders Payment to Non Victims Who Are Not Named In The Indictment. The Court Of Appeals Affirmed The Illegal Sentence In Violation Of This Court's Decisions In Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), Ex parte Lewis, 892 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), and Gordon v. State, 707 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court's failure to read the charge, which was submitted in writing to the jury, resulted in egregious harm to Appellant, as there was no evidence to suggest the jury failed to read the charge.

2. The Court of Appeals erred when it held the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's request to instruct the jury on manslaughter.

3. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that inclusion of a definition of the term "foreign legal consultant" in the jury charge was not error.

(Appellant's): If a trial judge accepts a jury verdict, releases the jurors from their oaths, allows the former jurors to leave the courtroom and tells them they are free to discuss the case, sentences the defendant in accordance with the legal verdict, and then improperly reconvenes the jury for a second deliberation over objection, should the court of appeals reform the judgment to reflect the only proper, legal verdict?

2. The lower court failed to properly apply the deferential review required by Strickland v. Washington's conduct prong and instead construed every presumption of reasonableness against defense counsel. RR 3:155-56; CR:232.

2. Due to the permissive nature of the Court's holding in Juarez v. State regarding the specificity with which an indictment charging the offense of failure to register as a sex offender must be pleaded, a situation has been created which deprives defendants of their due process right to notice of the charge against them as well as their right to effective assistance of counsel and has resulted in the potential for unnecessary litigation and confusion among the bench and bar.

6. In light of Barbernell, can abstract submission of both intoxication definitions constitute harmful error under Almanza where the application paragraph tracks the information's use of the subjective intoxication definition?

2. The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law that has not been but which should be decided by this Honorable Court in that it has held the petitioner may be questioned on the indictment allegations to which no plea was entered.

2. Whether Applicant's guilty pleas were rendered involuntary because the State re-indicted Applicant's brother after Applicant appealed his convictions.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that repeated misstatements of the law by the prosecutor and judge, reinforced by a misleading Powerpoint presentation, would not have misled the jury regarding the law.

4. By holding that a party must use the words "reliability" or "accuracy" and specifically refer to Evidence Rule 702 as a prerequisite to asserting a challenge to the reliability or accuracy of scientific evidence in order to preserve error, the court of appeals appears to have misconstrued the meaning of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence Rule 103.

2. The trial court abused its discretion ruling in admitting Officer Francis Paul LaSalle's expert testimony concerning Appellant's purported use of hydrocodone.

2. By failing to properly clothe a child one to two years of age in a manner necessary for the cold weather and surroundings has the appellant engaged in conduct which placed the child in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, and physical and mental impairment as contemplated by the Texas Penal Code § 22.041(c)? TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(c) (Jones McClure 2011).

5. Is a defense attorney's unsworn argument sufficient to satisfy his client's burden of proof under article 42.12 section 24 such that revocation was an abuse of discretion in this case?

2. Is the evidence of appellant's intent sufficient to support his conviction under the law of parties?

2. Is the reasonableness of an officer's opinion of a suspect's understanding of an undisputed question and answer recorded on video a "fact issue" for the jury to resolve pursuant to Article 38.23?

(Court's Own Motion) Did the Court of Appeals err to find that Appellant met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor's use of his peremptory strikes?

(State) Does the Fourteenth Court of Appeals' determination that the offense of aggravated assault committed by reckless conduct is not a lesser included offense of the offense of aggravated assault committed by intentional or knowing conduct run afoul of the plain language of Article 37.09 and the spirit of Grey v. State, 298 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)?

(6) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting and requesting a mistrial or continuance in response to Dr. Kaner's conduct.

2. Did the Panel Majority, in conflict with opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and decisions of the Unites States Supreme Court, err to infer from the record testimony that, notwithstanding the trial court's finding to the contrary, the evidence demonstrates the trial court could have concluded that a reasonable person in Johnson's position would have believed that he was free to ignore officer Hendrie's requests or terminate the interaction, and therefore the initial interaction between Hendrie and Johnson was a voluntary encounter rather than a Fourth Amendment seizure?

2. Did the Court err in its opinion that Petitioner waived the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review when she entered a conditional plea of no contest to every element except the intent to defraud and the Trial Court agreed to hear the case based on the conditional plea of no contest to protect Petitioner's right to deferred adjudication.

3. The Court of Appeals misapplied Terry v. Ohio by ignoring Terry's underlying rationale which, in effect, authorizes law enforcement to call a proverbial time-out to maintain the status quo in order to discern whether a scenario requires further legal action when a reasonable articulable suspicion exists.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals' panel majority erred by holding the lack of the requested instruction was harmful where there was no evidence whatsoever of "retreat," or even the possibility thereof, and where a self-defense claim would have failed regardless of whether Appellant was legally required to retreat or not.

3. The Court of Appeals has misconstrued and misapplied Article 17.15(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in apparently finding that the Legislature intended Article 17.15(5) to apply as an exception to the release of Appellant because of delay under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. Is instructing the jury that it may infer intent or knowledge from acts done or words spoken ever harmful, alone or in combination with other erroneous instructions?

(b) The decision of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals requires review because the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of supervision. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 66.3(f).

2. Did the Court of Appeals violate Petitioner's state constitutional trial rights to confrontation and cross-examination by upholding the trial court's exclusion, pursuant to Rule 606(b) Tex.R.Evid., of juror testimony and affidavits offered for purposes of Petitioner's Motion for New Trial on the ground that a juror conveyed to other jurors harmful information obtained from her internet research during an overnight break in deliberations? Issues

3. When law enforcement officers remain in a person's residence without a warrant under the guise of conducting a warrant check after the homeowner unequivocally tells officers to leave the residence, are they committing the offense of Criminal Trespass which would render any evidence seized after the intrusion inadmissible?

4. The court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove criminally negligent homicide where the appellant was admittedly distracted by talking on a cell phone at the time that she attempted to cross in front of other vehicles to enter the interstate highway ramp, which she had already missed by 92 feet.

4. Is a conviction for an offense listed in TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.134 -- but not alleged to have been committed in a drug-free zone -- a "conviction under any other criminal statute"?

4. Did Appellant suffer actual harm, egregious or otherwise, from submission of an unknown manner and means of asphyxiation?

3. Can Appellee's statements, which supplied the probable cause to arrest him, be rendered inadmissible because of statements he made after probable cause arose and was manifested by him to the deputies, i.e., should the later statements be considered in the analysis of whether he was in custody when the earlier statements were made?

(2) [Whether] a defendant is estopped from raising an illegal sentence claim when he knew at the time of sentencing that the enhancement paragraph as alleged was improper, but agreed to the sentence pursuant to a plea bargain agreement.

2. The appellate court erred in holding that inadmissible, prejudicial and inflammatory hearsay admitted by the trial court was harmless.

6. Did the Second Court of Appeals also run afoul of State v. Moreno by ruling contrary to the article 44.01(a)(1)'s legislative history, detailed in Moreno, which indicates that provision's enactment sought to grant Texas prosecutors the broad authority to appeal akin to the broad right of appeal enjoyed by federal prosecutors? State v, Moreno, 807 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 44.01(a)(1).

2. The court of appeals erred in holding that a statutory county court judge could not issue a blood search warrant for a DWI suspect located in another county.

2. When confronted with an alleged violation of article 33.011, the Court of Appeals erred in applying a constitutional harm analysis in disregard of binding precedent from this Court.

2. Is a Nunc Pro Tunc order a proper vehicle to correct a trial court's erroneous entry cumulating sentences, if there is a finding and determination that: 1) the trial court's error was clerical; 2) there is no other adequate remedy at law[?]

Ed. Note: See companion case (Crystal Michelle Watson; No. PD-0287-11)

3. (whether) if such a claim can be raised for the first time on habeas, and if it is meritorious, what the proper remedy for such a claim would be.

Ed. Note: See companion case (Jack Wayne Smith; No. PD-0288-11)

7. Whether Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional as applied to applicant because it requires a mandatory death sentence if the jury answers the special issues in the affirmative even if the jury believed that applicant did not deserve to die.

2. An important question implicating the administration of justice is presented by the court of appeals' holding, contrary to the dictates of §15.02(c)(2), Texas Penal Code, that a conviction for conspiracy can be sustained even though the only other conspirators have been acquitted.