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Rarefied Air

Frivolous Briefs - Can't We All Just Get Along?

by David A. Schulman
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I drafted my first appellate brief in 1985, when I was a law student clerking for Chuck Lanehart. I don't remember the client's name, but I recall that he went into a local pharmacy

in Lubbock and demanded the pharmacist give him "all the dilaudid." When told the pharmacy had no dilaudid, our fellow said, "then give me all your money." There were quite a few issues available for litigation.

I was licensed a little over a year later. I knew about Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and I knew about "Anders" briefs. What I heard from other lawyers was that preparing an Anders brief was harder than preparing a brief with substantive issues. That was the extent of it, however, as,




in the first five years I was licensed, I never had an appeal in which I had to search for an issue to raise. All told, I filed appellate briefs in 35-40 cases in that period, and never filed an <u>Anders</u> brief.

When I went into private practice, after working at the Court of Criminal Appeals, I soon encountered my first appeal in which finding an issue to raise was impossible -- nothing had been preserved for appeal. As I had never had a "frivolous" appeal, I had to determine how one did it, so I began researching to find out how to do an <u>Anders</u> brief. What I discovered was the



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


procedure set up in <u>High v. State</u>, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). Under <u>High</u>, an attorney may comply with the requirements of <u>Anders</u> by submitting his or her "professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance."

Having found <u>High</u> and figuring out that preparing a "frivolous" appeal brief wasn't any more difficult than preparing a regular brief, I filed my first <u>Anders</u> brief, included my professional evaluation, and asked to withdraw. That was in 1994.

In 2005, Fort Worth Court of Appeals <u>Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot</u> and I co-authored a paper on <u>Anders</u> briefs entitled, "<u>Meritless Appeals, Frivolous Appeals, and Anders v. California</u>

in the 21st Century," for presentation at the University of Texas School of Law "Conference on Criminal Appeals." We covered when and how to prepare an Anders brief, and discussed some of the ethical issues involved when appellate counsel believes there is nothing he or she can do to for the client on appeal.



Between my first <u>Anders</u> brief and the paper I co-authored with Justice Dauphinot, was involved in

co-authored with Justice Dauphinot, was involved in more than 300 appeals all over the State. Based on that experience, I came to believe that, in approximately sixty percent (60%) of all criminal appeals in Texas, there are no issues which are not non-frivolous. Sadly, however, in at least half of those cases, the defense lawyer handling the appeal will make a substantive challenge to the conviction by raising an issue which they know can be made, but which they also know has absolutely no chance of succeeding. They should be filing an Anders brief, but,



for the reasons I discuss herein, they find it more advantageous not to do so.

I believe that this occurs for two inter-related issues. First, defense lawyers generally believe the "an <u>Anders</u> brief is harder to do than a regular brief" mantra, and they don't want to have to resort to

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submitting one. I have always found this particularly disturbing, as I believe that, when done correctly, writing a "regular" brief is just as difficult as writing an <u>Anders</u> brief. I work from a check-list¹ which covers all of the fundamental issues which should be discussed in a professional evaluation.

The second reason, and one which I find much more troubling, is that many counties are now paying less than the usual fee for representation on appeal if court-appointed counsel files an <u>Anders</u> brief. I believe that this is because the filing of an <u>Anders</u> brief causes the local clerk to have to deal directly with the defendant and, just as important to the local courts, has to pay to produce another copy of the


record to send to the defendant. Most counties look at these as unnecessary expenses. So, to avoid the situation, they make it advantageous for court-appointed appellate counsel to not file an <u>Anders</u> brief. In Travis County, for example (see form on the left), the fee for an <u>Anders</u> brief is only half of the already ridiculously low \$2,000 fee for a non-capital appeal.

This brings up a problem which has raised its (in my opinion) ugly head in the last year, which is the phenomena of attorneys mounting no substantive challenges to the conviction, but raising only a challenge to the imposition of court costs in the particular case. I have no problem, mind you, with an attorney making a challenge to the improper imposition of court

costs. My problem is when it is done in lieu of any substantive challenge to the conviction. I echo the sentiments of First Court of Appeals' Justice Evelyn Keyes, in <u>Hearne v. State</u>, 415 S.W.3d 365 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st] 2013)(see G&S, Vol. 21, No. 38; 09/23/2013), in which she



[•] Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case; whether the Clerk's Record or any discussion set out in the Reporter's Record indicates that there were any matters raised in pre-trial motions and rejected by the trial Court; whether any errors occurred during jury selection; whether the evidence presented is legally sufficient to sustain the conviction; whether, anything in the record indicates that counsel's performance was deficient; and whether there are any irregularities with the assessment of court costs as set out in the judgment.



pointed out that, "by choosing to raise this issue as [Appellant]'s sole complaint on appeal, his counsel has effectively prevented this Court from addressing any issues relating to the merits of [Appellant]'s underlying conviction and punishment and has effectively waived [Appellant]'s right to appellate review on the merits of his case." She also argued that, "counsel's failure to raise any issues addressing the merits of the underlying conviction without following the protections of the Anders procedure deprives [Appellant] of important constitutional rights." She would strike such briefs — so would I.

There are two cases from the Waco Court of Appeals which will be summarized in next week's report -- McElwain v.

State (see 6&5, Vol. 22, No. 11; 03/17/2014) and Ferguson v. State (see 6&5, Vol. 22, No. 11; 03/17/2014), which illuminate the problem. Both cases involve issues which are not substantive attacks on the judgment of conviction, but involve matters which require only reformation of the written judgment.

The problem in <u>McElwain</u> pertains to court costs. The Court of Appeals recognized an "arguable" issue which appellate counsel did not, which is that, although the defendant



is indigent, the judgment assessed attorney's fees as costs of court. Because counsel had not addressed the issue and explained why it would not lead to relief, the case was abated for appointment of a new lawyer and briefing on that issue. Justice Scoggins dissented, arguing that the Court could "simply reform the trial court's judgment to eliminate the court-appointed

attorney's fees and affirm the judgment as modified."



In <u>Ferguson</u>, although appellate counsel filed an <u>Anders</u> brief, she also pointed out that the judgment incorrectly reflected the age of the victim. That fact changes nothing in the case (such as guilt/innocence or punishment range), but has impact on events in the future. Because the issue was raised by appellate counsel, the judgment was reformed and

affirmed as modified. Chief Justice Gray filed a concurring opinion, noting that there is a "divergence of authority" (a polite way of saying the Courts of Appeals are all over the map on <u>Anders</u> rules), and that whether there is a path "which is more direct and less costly lies with the Court of Criminal Appeals."

Chief Justice Gray is correct, although I think the problems go much deeper than problems with how frivolous appeals are handled. I truly belief that, recent changes to the Rules of Appellate Procedure notwithstanding, the procedures used for handling criminal appeals in our State is absolutely broken.

Having been involved in over 500 appeals in my career in something like 60 counties, I am now of the opinion

